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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal transferred from the
Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2005).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No, 1: Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment
holding that Utah's nonprofit corporations act did not apply to the plaintiff nonprofit
corporation in this case, and that the mail-in vote on the claimed special assessment that
is the subject of this case was valid notwithstanding that the results admittedly were not
unanimous as required by Utah's nonprofit corporations act.
Standard of Review: "We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002
UT 95 U 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors
Unlimited, 2001 UT 100 5 19, 40 P.3d 581) (internal quotations omitted).
Demonstration that Issue No, 1 Was Preserved in the District Court: This
issues of the application of Utah's nonprofit corporations act to plaintiff and the resulting
statutory invalidity of the subject mail-in vote was one of the principal arguments briefed
and argued to the district court by Defendants-Appellants Lawrence K. Deppe and Judith
S. Deppe (the "Deppes"). E.g., R. 0385-0389 (pp. 1-5 of "Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment" ("Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo")); R. 0425-
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0427 (pp. 1-4 of "Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment" ("Deppes' Summary Judgment Reply Memo"); R. 0502-0503
(Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript, at pp. 12-16).

Issue No, 2: Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment ruling
the Deppes were the owners of the subject condominium unit at the time the claimed
special assessment that is the subject of this case purportedly was levied, who therefore
could be held liable for the claimed assessment under Utah's condominium ownership
act, failing to apply the doctrine of equitable conversion.
Standard of Review: "We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002
UT 95 1J5, 61 P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors
Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, f 9, 40 P.3d 581) (internal quotations omitted).
Demonstration that Issue No. 2 was Preserved in the District Court:
Application of the doctrine of equitable conversion and applicable statutory law to this
case to show the Deppes were not the owners of the subject condominium unit when the
claimed special assessment purportedly was levied, and therefore as a matter of statutory
law they were not liable to pay any part of the claimed assessment even if it was valid,
were among the principal arguments briefed and argued by the Deppes in the district
court. E.g., R. 0367-0368 & 0384-0385 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo, pp.
5-8); R 0429-0430 (Deppes' Summary Judgment Reply Memo, pp. 6-7); R. 0502-0503
(Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript, at p. 11).
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
The following determinative statutes are applicable to this appeal:1
Utah Code § 16-6-33 (1999 Repl.) (repealed by SB 61, 2000 Gen. Sess.,
effective April 30,2001):
Any action required by this act to be taken at a meeting of the
members or trustees of a nonprofit corporation, or any action
which may be taken at a meeting of the members or trustees may
be taken without a meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth
the action so taken, shall be signed by all of the members entitled
to vote with respect to the subject matter thereof, or all of the
trustees, as the case may be.

Utah Code § 16-6-22(12) (1999 Repl.):
Each nonprofit corporation shall have power: ... (12) To make
and alter bylaws, or resolutions, not inconsistent with its articles
of incorporation or with the laws of this state, for the
administration and regulation of the affairs of the corporation.

Utah Code § 57-8-35(1) (Supp. 2000):
The provisions of this chapter shall be in addition and
supplemental to all other provisions of law, statutory or judicially
declared, provided that wherever the application of the provisions
of this chapter conflict with the application of such other
provisions, this chapter shall prevail....

Utah Code § 57-8-20(2) (1986):
The amount of common expenses assessed against each unit is a
debt of the owner at the time the assessment is made and is
1

There is no dispute that the statutes determinative of this appeal are those that were in
place when the mail-in vote that is the subject of this appeal was taken, i.e., those that
were in effect in the fall of the year 2000. See e.g., R. 0388-0389 (Deppes' Initial
Summary Judgment Memo, pp. 1-2 (so explaining, and uncontested by plaintiff)).
358387 l.DOC
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collectible as such. ... If any unit owner fails or refuses to make
any payment of the common expenses when due, that amount
constitutes a lien on the interest of the owner in the property, and
upon the recording of notice of lien by the manager or
management committee it is a lien upon the unit owner's interest
in the property ....

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff-Appellee Park West Condominium Association, Inc. (the "Association")

brought this action seeking, against the Deppes, to enforce a claimed special assessment
(the "Claimed Assessment") that the Association purportedly levied against a
condominium unit previously owned by the Deppes (the "Subject Condo").
The Deppes answered denying any liability for the Claimed Assessment on several
bases, including:
1.

That the Claimed Assessment was statutorily void, invalid, and of no

force or effect because the mail-in vote conducted by the Association purportedly
approving the Claimed Assessment did not comply with the requirement of Utah's
nonprofit corporations act that votes conducted by mail must receive unanimous
approval; and
2.

That pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion the Deppes were not

the "owner" of the Subject Condo when the Claimed Assessment purportedly was
levied, and therefore as a matter of statutory law were not liable to pay the Claimed
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Assessment even if it was valid, because they had already by then entered into a
binding contract for the sale of the Subject Condo.
The Deppes also filed a counterclaim against the Association and a cross-claim
against their co-defendant Bryan T. Morgan who had purchased the Subject Condo from
the Deppes prior to the levy of the Claimed Assessment.
The Association and the Deppes filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the
Association's claims.2 The Association sought to enforce the Claimed Assessment and a
purported Assumption Agreement relating to the Claimed Assessment. The Deppes
sought to have the Claimed Assessment and the purported Assumption Agreement
declared void, invalid, and otherwise unenforceable as against them as a matter of law.
On August 26, 2005, the district court entered a "Minute Entry" ruling on the
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. That Minute Entry expressly provided
that it was the court's order on the cross-motions and that no further order was necessary.
That Minute Entry is therefore referred to hereinafter as the "Order."
The district court's Order, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1,
ruled that the Assumption Agreement referenced by the Association does not create any
The Association originally filed a motion for summary judgment on December 31,
2002. Proceedings on that motion were voluntarily stayed by the parties pending
conducting certain discovery. The Association later retained different legal counsel and
filed a second summary judgment motion dated May 5, 2005, without any disposition
having been made of its 2002 motion. The Association's motion dated May 5, 2005 was
largely a repeat of its original 2002 motion (hereafter in this brief all references to the
Association's motion mean, refer to, and include both its 2002 and its 2005 motions).
Deppes therefore submitted one memorandum in opposition to the Association's motion,
and in support of a cross-motion for summary judgment that they also filed. The district
court's order that is the subject of this appeal was the ruling on the Association's motion
and the Deppes' cross-motion.
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obligation of the Deppes to pay the Claimed Assessment. (Addendum No. 1 hereto, R. 0445
(Order, p. 12)). That ruling has not been appealed by the Association and therefore stands.
The district court's Order, however, also included each of the following rulings:
1.

That notwithstanding the mail-in vote admittedly did not comply with the

requirements of Utah's nonprofit corporations act, the Claimed Assessment was
nevertheless valid because the mail-in vote on the Claimed Assessment was
purportedly allowed by the Association's internal rules and bylaws; the district court
effectively ruled that the Association could contract around the express
requirements of Utah's nonprofit corporations act (Addendum No. 1 hereto,
R. 0443-0444 (Order, pp. 10-11)); and
2.

That the Deppes were the "owner" of the Subject Condo when the

Claimed Assessment purportedly was levied, and were therefore obligated to pay
the Claimed Assessment, notwithstanding that they admittedly had contracted to sell
the Subject Condo prior to that time; the district court simply ignored the doctrine of
equitable conversion that governs in Utah (Addendum No. 1 hereto, R. 0444 (Order,
P.

li)).

Each of these rulings in the district court's Order is incorrect as a matter of law and
is the subject of this appeal.

II.

Statement of Facts
There was and is no dispute as to any of the following material facts. In addition

to the other record support noted below for each referenced fact, all record citations
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below to "R. 0403" are to paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Association's combined summary
judgment opposition and reply memorandum in which the Association expressly stated
that did not dispute the referenced facts.
1.

The Association is a nonprofit corporation which operates a condominium

project located in Park City, Summit County, Utah, historically known as the Park West
Condominiums Project ("Park West Condominiums"). {See e.g., R. 0002
(Association's Complaint, \ 3); R.0058 (Association's Amended Complaint, f 2)).
2.

The Deppes previously owned a certain condominium unit (the "Subject

Condo") within the Park West Condominiums. {See e.g., R. 0398 (Deppes' Initial
Summary Judgment Memo, f 7 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials
cited therein and attached thereto); R. 0403).
3.

In the year 2000, the Association was considering making substantial

renovations to the Park West Condominiums, and decided to try to obtain the approval of
the Association's members to levy a proposed special assessment (identified and referred
to above, and hereinafter, as the "Claimed Assessment" that is the subject of this appeal)
to pay the costs of the contemplated improvements. {See e.g., R. 0397 (Deppes' Initial
Summary Judgment Memo,ffl[8-9 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the
materials cited therein and attached thereto); R. 0403).
4.

Unable to obtain the required quorum to hold a vote at a meeting of

Association members, the Association instead subsequently ignored the nonprofit
corporation act pursuant to which they were incorporated and chose to conduct a vote on
the Claimed Assessment by mail-in ballot, relying upon the following provision
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appearing in Article XXVIII of the Association's 1981 Amended Condominium
Declaration for Park West Condominiums regarding consent in lieu of a vote at a
meeting:
In any case in which the Act or this Declaration requires the vote of a stated
percentage of the Project's undivided ownership interest for authorization
or approval of a transaction, such requirement may be fully satisfied by
obtaining, with or without a meeting, consents in writing to such
transaction from Unit Owners who collectively hold at least the stated
percentage of undivided ownership interest.
(See e.g., R. 0396-0398 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo, 1fl[ 8-12 of Deppes'
Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and attached thereto);
R. 0403).
5.

The vote on the Claimed Assessment was held only by the Association's

chosen mail-in ballot procedure, and was not held at any meeting of Association
members. (See e.g., R. 0396-0397 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo, ^ 12 of
Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and attached
thereto); R. 0403).
6.

According to the Association's own official vote tally, 17% of the

Association's members who were entitled to vote (including the Deppes) did not cast any
vote at all on the Claimed Assessment, and another 19% of those who did vote voted
against the imposition of the Claimed Assessment. (See e.g., R. 0395 (Deppes' Initial
Summary Judgment Memo, ^ 18 & 19 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the
materials cited therein and attached thereto); R. 0403).
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7.

Ignoring the nonprofit corporation code, the Association nevertheless

declared the Claimed Assessment was approved and passed, claiming that a simple
majority approval was all that was needed under Article XVIII of the Association's 1981
Amended Condominium Declaration for Park West Condominiums which states:
In assessing Unit Owners, for capital improvements, no assessment for a
single improvement in the nature of a capital expenditure exceeding the
sum of $10,000.00 shall be made without the same having been first voted
on and approved by at least a majority of the Project's undivided ownership
interest.
(R. 0395 & 0397 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo,ffij10 & 20-21 of Deppes'
Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and attached thereto);
R. 0403).
8.

On December 14, 2005, a "Notice of Special Assessment" was signed by

the then-attorney for the Association (who was not a manager or member of the
Management Committee), and which he then recorded with the Summit County
Recorder's Office on December 15, 2004. (See e.g., R. 0395 (Deppes' Initial Summary
Judgment Memo, % 20 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited
therein and attached thereto); R. 0403).
9.

On or about January 20, 2001, the Association, through its authorized

property manager, sent the Notice of Special Assessment to its members (and admittedly
not to the Deppes) by certified mail, notifying members (and admittedly not the Deppes)
of the Claimed Assessment and stating and confirming that the Claimed Assessment was
effective as of December 14, 2000. (See e.g., R. 0394 & 0395 (Deppes' Initial Summary
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Judgment Memo,fflj21 & 25 of Deppes9 Statement of Material Facts, and the materials
cited therein and attached thereto); R. 0403).
10.

The Claimed Assessment was to be paid in two installments, the first of

which was to become due on February 28, 2001, and the second of which was to become
due on June 28, 2001. (See e.g., R. 0394 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo,
Tf 26 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and attached
thereto); R. 0403).
11.

The work for the renovations for which the Claimed Assessment was

purportedly levied did not commence until at least late-spring or early summer of 2001.
(See e.g., R. 0394 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment Memo, TJ 27 of Deppes' Statement
of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and attached thereto); R. 0403).
12.

On December 13, 2000, the Deppes had entered into an irrevocable and

binding contract to sell the Subject Condo to purchaser Bryan T. Morgan, executing
Addendum 3 to the sales contract. (See e.g., R. 0395 (Deppes' Initial Summary
Judgment Memo, ^f 22 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited
therein and attached thereto); Addendum No. 1 hereto, R. 0437-0438 (Order, pp. 4-5,
finding the execution of Addendum 3 on December 13, 2000, created a contract. The
Association did not appeal that finding)).
13.

The Deppes signed a deed to Mr. Morgan on January 2, 2001, and that deed

was recorded on January 5, 2001. (See e.g., R. 0394 (Deppes' Initial Summary Judgment
Memo, U 23 of Deppes' Statement of Material Facts, and the materials cited therein and
attached thereto); R. 0403).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court's ruling that the Deppes are liable for the Claimed Assessment
that is the subject of this case is fatally flawed both in its conclusion that the Claimed
Assessment was not void and invalid under Utah's nonprofit corporations act, and in its
conclusion that the Deppes were the owners of the Subject Condo subject to liability for
the Claimed Assessment even if it was valid. On each, or either, of these bases, this
Court should reverse the district court's Order, and hold the Deppes are not liable to pay
the Claimed Assessment.
The district court erred in ruling that the Association's internal mail-in voting rules
somehow trumped Utah's nonprofit corporations act and circumvented the requirement of
that act that votes conducted by mail-in ballot be approved by the unanimous written
consent of all of those members entitled to vote. Such a ruling is without support and is
indeed contrary to established statutory and case law. It also is against public policy as it
would allow nonprofit corporations to flagrantly circumvent express requirements of the
corporate code with impunity, rendering the corporate code meaningless and useless.
Having sought the protections of incorporating, the Association indisputably is subject to
all requirements of the corporate code, and may not contract around them. Since the
Claimed Assessment admittedly was not unanimously approved by all Association
members as indisputably required by Utah's nonprofit corporations act, the Claimed
Assessment is void and invalid under that act which governs this case. This Court should
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therefore reverse the district court's Order and declare the Claimed Assessment void,
invalid, and unenforceable as against the Deppes.
The district court also erred in failing to apply the doctrine of equitable
conversion. Pursuant to Utah statute, only the "owner" of a condominium unit may be
held liable for a special assessment, like the Claimed Assessment that is the subject of
this case, that is levied against the unit. By the time the Claimed Assessment was levied
in this case, however, the Deppes had already entered into a binding written contract for
the sale of the Subject Condo. Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion which
governs in Utah, the Deppes therefore were not the owners of the Subject Condo when
the Claimed Assessment purportedly was levied. Accordingly, even if the Claimed
Assessment was valid, which it was not, the Deppes were not "owners" subject to
liability to pay it. This Court should therefore reverse the district court's Order and hold
the Deppes free from liability for the Claimed Assessment.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE ASSOCIATION'S
MAIL-IN VOTE ON THE CLAIMED ASSESSMENT THAT
ADMITTEDLY DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS ACT
The mail-in vote upon the Claimed Assessment, and therefore the Claimed

Assessment itself, was void, invalid, and ineffectual for failure to comply with the
requirements of Utah's nonprofit corporations act.

A.

Utah's Nonprofit Corporations Act Applies to and Governs This Case,

This Court has previously confirmed that by incorporating into a homeowners
association, homeowners bind themselves to the requirements of Utah's nonprofit
corporations act. E.g., Levangerv. Vincent, 2000 UT App 103 f 13, 3 P.3d 187, 189.
Since the condominium owners in this case chose to incorporate into the Plaintiff
Association, there are therefore two state statutes that apply to and govern this case - the
Utah Condominium Ownership Act, as it was in effect when the subject vote was
conducted in the year 2000, appearing at Utah Code §§ 57-8-1 through -38 (the
"Condominium Act"), and the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Co-operative
Association Act as it was in effect at that same time, appearing at Utah Code §§ 16-6-18
through -112 (the "Nonprofit Corporations Act").
In the year 2000, when the voting on and purported approval of the Claimed
Assessment occurred, section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act provided as
follows:
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Any action required by this act to be taken at a meeting of the
members or trustees of a nonprofit corporation, or any action which may be
taken at a meeting of the members or trustees may be taken without a
meeting j / a consent in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be
signed by all of the members entitled to vote with respect to the subject
matter thereof or all of the trustees, as the case may be.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-33 (1999 Repl.) (repealed by SB 61, 2000 Gen. Sess., effective
April 30, 2001) (emphasis added). Although the Utah Legislature repealed this provision
in its 2000 General Session, the repeal of that provision and the imposition of the new
statute, did not become effective until April 30, 2001. See UT Legis 300 (2000), § 235
(setting effective date). Thus, at the time of the mail-in vote on the Claimed Assessment
at issue in this case was conducted in the year 2000, the Nonprofit Corporations Act was
very clear, and this Court has confirmed as shown below, that in order to approve any
action by a mail-in vote all of the members entitled to vote must unanimously approve
such action in writing.
This Court has explained the relationship between the Condominium Act and the
Nonprofit Corporations Act on more than one occasion. As explained in more detail
below, this Court's prior rulings confirm the following points relevant to and dispositive
of the instant case:
1.
The Nonprofit Corporations Act applies to condominium
associations such as the Association in this case.
2.
Where the Condominium Act is silent, the provisions of the
Nonprofit Corporations Act control.
3.
Because the voting procedures set forth in the Nonprofit
Corporations Act protect the members' interests, they are mandatory, and strict
compliance is required.
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4.
Pursuant to the Nonprofit Corporations Act, votes conducted by
mail-in ballots must be unanimous to be valid.
The first and second points were addressed in this Court's ruling in Reedeker v.
Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). At issue there was whether the tort claims
brought against certain past and present trustees of the American Towers Owners
Association were governed solely by the Condominium Act or whether the Nonprofit
Corporations Act's provision holding trustees liable only for intentional misconduct
should be applied. Id. at 584-85. Recognizing that section 57-8-35(1) of the
Condominium Act "specifically allows for application of other law within the
condominium context," this Court held that because the Condominium Act was silent on
the point, "the trustees of a condominium association incorporated as a nonprofit
corporation under the Nonprofit Corporation Act are, pursuant to section 57-8-35(1) of
the Condominium Act, subject to the liability provision contained within the Nonprofit
Corporation Act." Id. at 585.
Having established that the provisions of the Nonprofit Corporations Act apply
where the Condominium Act is silent, in Levanger v. Vincent, 2000 UT App 103, 3 P.3d
187, this Court addressed the third and fourth above-listed issues, which are at the heart
of the instant case: that the unanimity requirement for mail-in voting under the Nonprofit
Corporations Act, Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-33, must be strictly complied with. In
Levanger, the plaintiffs were members of the Highland Estates Property Owners
Association who sued the association's board of trustees seeking to have the court set
aside amendments to the covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&Rs") governing
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the association's conduct. When the trustees could not obtain the required vote of the
owners at the association's annual meeting, they decided that a mail-in ballot would be
the best way to notify the homeowners of the proposed changes to the CC&Rs and
maximize participation in the election. Id. Tflf 3-4. Of the 262 lot owners, 149 were in
favor of the amendments, 26 were opposed to them, and 87 did not vote. Id. % 6. While
the trial court concluded that this constituted a valid vote, this Court reversed, explaining:
We conclude that, because the voting procedures [set forth in the
Nonprofit Corporations Act] protect the members' interests, they are
mandatory rather than directory and therefore strict compliance is
required. Because the mail-in balloting procedure did not comply
strictly with either the Act or the Association's by-laws, we conclude it
was ineffectual.
Id. at 1f 19. The Court therefore invalidated the amendments to the CC&Rs that
were purportedly approved by the mail-in vote, because they were not approved
by all members and therefore "lacked unanimous written consent [required under
section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act] in the absence of a
shareholders meeting." Id.ffif15 & 19.
The same provisions and reasoning apply to invalidate the mail-in balloting on the
Claimed Assessment in the instant case. Section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporation
Act applies because the Condominium Act is silent as to the ability of an association to
conduct mail-in voting. Section 16-6-33 clearly establishes that a mail-in vote must be
unanimous. The mail-in vote in this case, however, admittedly was not unanimous - by
the Association's own official tally, 17% of the Association's members who were entitled
to vote (including the Deppes) did not vote at all, and another 19% of the Association's
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members who did vote voted against the Claimed Assessments. Since the mail-in vote
did not unanimously approve the Claimed Assessment, it did not strictly comply with
section 16-6-33. Accordingly, the mail-in vote upon the Claimed Assessment, and
therefore the Claimed Assessment itself, was void, invalid, and ineffectual.

B.

The District Court Erred in Holding the Mail-In Vote Was Valid
Under the Association's Internal Mail-In Voting Rule.

Ignoring the plain language of Utah Code Section 16-6-33 and this Court's
Reedeker and Levanger precedents, the district court in this case ruled as follows:
The Court is not persuaded by the Deppes argument that the Nonprofit Act
and the Utah Condominium Ownership Act in effect in 2000 prohibited the
mail in vote permitted by Article XXVIII of the 1981 Declaration. The
Utah Condominium Ownership Act permits a condominium homeowners'
association to create declarations. Where the declarations are silent, the
Utah Condominium Ownership Act applies and where it is silent, then the
Nonprofit Act applies. Here, the 1981 Declaration clearly permits a mail-in
vote and does not require written consent signed by all members for the
special assessment to occur without a meeting. Since the 1981 Declaration
is not silent on the issue, the two Acts referred to by the Deppes never come
into play on the issue of mail-in voting. The 1981 Declaration governs the
mail-in vote on the assessment. (R. 0443-0444 (Order, pp. 10-11)).
The district court, however, got its order of analysis precisely backward,
effectively ruling that nonprofit corporations may trump and circumvent the express and
unequivocal requirements of the Nonprofit Corporations Act by contracting around them
through adoption of inconsistent declarations, articles, or bylaws. Not only would
upholding the district court's decision be bad public policy, completely neutering the
entire corporate code and rendering it completely useless, meaningless, and without any
force or effect, it would also be contrary to governing law. Deppes have found no
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reported case in the entire country that has held, as the district court's Order in this case
holds, that a nonprofit corporation may circumvent the express and unequivocal
requirements of the corporate code, whether by adoption of inconsistent declarations,
articles, bylaws, or otherwise. To the contrary, it is well-settled that the preeminent
authority over a corporation is the state statutes under which it is created, and that all
articles of incorporation, bylaws, declarations, and other policies and documents of a
corporation are inferior and subject to, and must conform to, the requirements of such
statutes. See e.g., Harding v. Heritage Health Products Co., 98 P.3d 945 (Colo. App.
2004) (holding corporation's bylaws void where inconsistent with state law); Lange v.
Lange, 520 N.W. 2d 113 (Iowa 1994) (corporation is restricted to bylaws that are not
inconsistent with state law); Swanger v. NationalJuvenile Law Center, 714 S.W. 2d 170
(Mo. App. 1986) (holding corporation's bylaw void where inconsistent with statute's
superior statutory authority); In re Oceanside Properties, Inc., 14 B.R. 95, 104-105
(Bkrtcy, Hi. 1981) (corporate bylaws are "the lowest element of a three tired hierarchy;
[t]he corporation law is at the top, then come the articles of incorporation, then the bylaws. The lowest tier cannot be inconsistent with either of the higher tiers.").
Utah adheres to the principle that statutory provisions are superior to corporate
documents and that corporate documents must comport with the governing statutes.
Section 16-6-22(12) of the Nonprofit Corporations Act expressly provided at the time of
the vote on the Claimed Assessment at issue in this case that nonprofit corporations, such
as the Association in this case, have power only "To make and alter bylaws, or
resolutions, not inconsistent with its articles of incorporation or with the laws of this
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state, for the administration and regulation of the affairs of the corporation." Utah Code
Ann. § 16-6-22(12) (1999 Repl.) (repealed by SB 61, 2000 Gen. Sess., effective April 30,
2001) (emphasis added).
Article XVIII of the Association's internal rules and bylaws, which purports to
authorize less than unanimous mail-in voting, on its face is inconsistent with the
Nonprofit Corporations Act which, as noted above, at the time of the vote at issue in this
case expressly authorized approval of actions to be obtained by mail-in voting only "if...
all of the members entitled to vote with respect to the subject matter thereof approve of
the measure at issue. Utah Code § 16-6-33 (1999) (emphasis added). Article XVIII,
therefore, is invalid as a matter of law.
Rather than beginning and ending its analysis looking only at the provisions of the
Association's internal rules on mail-in voting, as the district court improperly did, the
following is the analysis that this Court must follow:
1.

Although not legally required to do so, the Association indisputably chose to
and did incorporate as a nonprofit corporation.

2.

As a matter of law, "by incorporating into a homeowners association, the
homeowners bound themselves to the requirements of Utah's Nonprofit
Corporations statute." Levanger v. Vincent, 2000 UT App 103 ^f 13, 3 P.3d
187, 189.

3.

Utah's Nonprofit Corporations Act as it read at the time of the vote upon the
Claimed Assessment stated that nonprofit corporations may approve actions
without a meeting of its members only "if a consent in writing, setting forth
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the action so taken, shall be signed by all of the members entitled to vote
with respect to the subject matter thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-33 (1999
Repl.) (repealed by SB 61, 2000 Gen. Sess., effective April 30, 2001)
(emphases added).
4.

The fact that the Association also is subject to the requirements of Utah's
Condominium Act does not excuse it from compliance with the Nonprofit
Corporations Act or allow it to adopt articles, bylaws, declarations, rules, or
anything else inconsistent with the Nonprofit Corporations Act. Having
chosen to incorporate as a nonprofit corporation, the Association must
comply with both the Utah Condominium Act and the Nonprofit
Corporations Act. Utah Code § 57-8-35(1) (stating provisions of Utah's
Condominium Act "shall be in addition and supplemental to all other
provisions of law, statutory or judicially declared"). See also e.g., Reedeker
v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (confirming
condominium owners' association was subject to the requirements of the
Nonprofit Corporations Act "in addition to" those of the Utah Condominium
Act).

5.

The Association admittedly chose to conduct a mail-in vote on the Claimed
Assessment, rather than holding a vote at a meeting of its members.

6.

The Association's mail-in vote conducted on the Claimed Assessment
indisputably did not win the approval of "a//" members, and therefore the
mail-in vote on the Claimed Assessment and the Claimed Assessment itself
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"was ineffectual" as a matter of law because it "did not strictly comply with
the [Nonprofit Corporations] Act's requirement of unanimous written
consent." Levanger, 2000 UT App 103 at ^ 15 & 19, 3 P.3d at 190 & 191
(holding Nonprofit Corporation Act's provisions regarding voting procedures
protect members' interests and are therefore "mandatory ... and therefore
strict compliance is required"; invalidating a homeowners association's mailin vote on approval of amendments to CC&Rs because it was not approved
by all members and therefore "lacked unanimous written consent [as required
under section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act] in the absence of a
shareholders meeting").
This Court should therefore reverse the district court's Order which improperly
held the Nonprofit Corporations Act did not apply to this case and which therefore
purported to validate the Association's fatally-defective non-unanimous mail-in vote
which was inconsistent with and in circumvention of the Nonprofit Corporations Act.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THE DEPPES WERE THE
OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT CONDO AT THE TIME OF THE CLAIMED
ASSESSMENT, FAILING TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE
CONVERSION
Even if the Claimed Assessment was valid, which it was not as shown above, the

district court's ruling that the Deppes are liable to pay it as the "owner" of the Subject
Condo is in error. At the time the Claimed Assessment purportedly was made, the
Condominium Act expressly provided:
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The amount of common expenses assessed against each unit is a debt of the
owner at the time the assessment is made and is collectible as such. [Utah
Code Ann. § 57-8-20(2) (1986) (emphasis added)].
In this case, the Association itself stated the effective date of the Claimed
Assessment was December 14, 2000, and that was the date on which the Association
recorded the Notice of Special Assessment with the Summit County Recorder's Office.
The undisputed facts of this case, however, show, and the district court properly held, that
by then the Deppes had already entered into a valid and binding contract for the sale of
the Subject Condo, on December 13, 2000. The district court's ruling that the Deppes
nevertheless were the "owner" of the Subject Condo when the Claimed Assessment was
made on December 14, 2000, purportedly because the sale did close until January 5,
2001, when the Deppes' deed was recorded because "the Deppes retained possession and
bore the risk of loss on the unit" until then, improperly ignores the doctrine of equitable
conversion that governs in Utah.
In Utah the doctrine of equitable conversion provides that once parties enter into
an enforceable contract for the sale of property, title to the property equitably passes to
the buyer who is then treated as the owner even though the deed conveying legal title
may not be delivered until later. Cannefax v. Clement, 818 P.2d 546, 550-51 (Utah
1991). The district court's correct and unchallenged finding that the Deppes had a
contract to sell the Subject Condo on December 13, 2000, as a matter of law is all that is
required for the doctrine of equitable conversion to apply. Pursuant to that doctrine, as a
matter of law Bryan T. Morgan became the owner of the Subject Condo on December 13,
2000, when, as the district court found, a binding contract was reached. It was Bryan T.
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Morgan, therefore, who was the owner of the Subject Condo when the Claimed
Assessment purportedly was levied on December 14, 2000, not the Deppes. As a matter
of law, therefore, pursuant to Section 57-8-20(2) of the Condominium Act, even if the
Claimed Assessment was validly made, it is a debt only of Bryan T. Morgan, the then
owner of the Subject Condo, not of the Deppes. The district court's ruling that the
Deppes were owners subject to the Claimed Assessment is in error, including for not
applying the doctrine of equitable conversion. The district court's references in the Ordei
to the Deppes having retained possession of the Subject Condo until final closing is
legally irrelevant, including under the doctrine of equitable conversion, as is the district
court's reference to who purportedly bore the risk of loss until closing, including since
risk of loss relates only to damage or destruction of the premises which indisputably did
not occur in this case.
Additionally, the Utah Condominium Act at the time of the Claimed Assessment
also provided that a lien against a condominium unit to secure an assessment could arise
only: (i) "[i]f any unit owner fails or refuses to make any payment of the common
expenses when due," and then only (ii) "upon the recording of notice of lien by the
manager or management committee." Utah Code § 57-8-20(2) (1986) (emphases added).
In this case the first instalment payment on the Claimed Assessment was not due until
February 28, 2001. Regardless of whether one measures by the date of the Deppes'
contract to sell the Subject Condo (December 13, 2000), the date the Deppes signed the
deed conveying legal title to the Subject Condo (January 2, 2001), or the date the
Deppes' deed conveying legal title was recorded (January 5, 2001), the first instalment
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payment on the Claimed Assessment was not due until long after the Deppes had sold the
Subject Condo to Bryan Morgan. Accordingly, there could not have been any failure or
refusal by the Deppes to pay the assessment "when due" before the sale, because there
was no portion of it "due" before the sale. Additionally, the notice of the Claimed
Assessment that was recorded in the Summit County Recorder's Office (a copy of which
from the district court record is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2) indisputably and on
its face was signed by "James R. Blakesley, Attorney for Association" and was recorded
by him, and not by the Association's manager or management committee as required by
statute. Also, the claimed lien notice was premature in that it was recorded on
December 15, 2000, before there even arguably could have been any failure to pay the
Claimed Assessment "when due." The Association, therefore, cannot meet either of the
two elements required for the existence of any lien securing the Claimed Assessment,
particularly not any lien chargeable against the Deppes who sold the Subject Condo long
before any part of the Claimed Assessment arguably became due. The Claimed
Assessment is chargeable, if at all, only against the new owner, Bryan T. Morgan.
This Court should reverse the district court's Order, hold the doctrine of equitable
conversion must be applied to this case, and hold that the Deppes were not owners of the
Subject Condo subject to any liability for the Claimed Assessment when it was made.

CONCLUSION
The district court's Order is in error on each of the issues addressed above. The
Deppes therefore respectfully request this Court to reverse the district court, and declare
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the Deppes are not liable in any way to pay any part of the Claimed Assessment that was
void and ineffectual to begin with since the mail-in vote upon the Claimed Assessment
did not obtain unanimous approval as required by the Nonprofit Corporations Act, and
that in any event was not made nor due until long after the Deppes had already sold the
Subject Condo. The Deppes respectfully request the Court to hear oral argument in this
case, and to reverse the district court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7 dayofJanuary, 2006.

Bradley L. T\\y
Joan M. Andrews
Fabian & Clendenin, PC
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
Lawrence K. Deppe and Judith S. Deppe
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS LAWRENCE K. DEPPE AND JUDITH S. DEPPE,
and of the Addenda that follow this page, were mailed by first-class mail with postage
fully prepaid this / Atiayof January, 2006, to each of the following:
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Bret W. Reich
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
James R. Blakesley, Esq.
2595 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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ADDENDUM NO. 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PARK WEST CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION
INC.,
Plaintiff,

:

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 010500391

vs.

:
:

BRYAN T. MORGAN, LAWRENCE K.
DEPPE AND JUDITH S. DEPPE,

::
:

Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK

:

August 26, 2005

Defendants.

The above matter came before the court on August 15, 2002,
for oral argument on Park West Condominium Association Inc.
(Association) and Lawrence K. Deppe and Judith S. Deppe's
(Deppes) cross motions for summary judgment.1

The Association

was present through Denver C. Snuffer and Deppes were present
through Bradley L. Tilt.
FACTS
The Deppes previously owned condominium unit #32B
(condominium unit) within the Park West Condominiums project
(Condominium Project) located at 1920 Canyon Resort Drive, #32B,
in Park City, Summit County, Utah, near what is now known as The
Canyons ski resort.

The Association, comprised of members owning

units in the condominium project, is the administrative body that
controls, operates and manages the Condominium Project.

1

Additional parties not involved in the cross motions are
not included or referred to in this decision.

0434

On March 3, 1977, the Condominium Project's developer caused
to be recorded a "Condominium Declaration for Park West
Condominiums" (the 1977 Declaration) in the office of the County
Recorder of Summit County as Entry No. 136576, in Book M90, at
page 843.

See Deppes Exhibit 1.

On June 18, 1981, the Condominium Project's developer caused
to be recorded an "Amended Condominium Declaration for Park West
Condominiums" (the 1981 Declaration) in the office of the County
Recorder of Summit County as Entry No. 180651, in Book M190, at
page 142.

See Deppes Exhibit 2.

The 1981 Declaration

incorporated by reference the By-Law of the Condominium Project,
attached as Exhibit C and recorded at the same time.

See Deppes

Exhibit 3.
On September 1, 1994, the Association caused to be recorded
in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County an
"Amendment to Declaration of Condominium for Park West
Condominiums" (the 1994 Amendment) as Entry No. 00417267, in Book
844, at page 462.

See Deppes Exhibit 4.

The 1994 Amendment,

among other things, (1) transferred the control, operation and
management of the Condominium Project from the developer to the
Association and (2) amended and superceded Article VI of the 1981
Declaration with the revisions set forth in the 1994 Amendment.
During 1999 and 2000, the Association's Management Committee
(Management Committee) was actively discussing the possibility of
-2-
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making substantial improvements to the exterior of the
Condominium Project.

In September 2000, the Management Committee

decided to try to obtain the approval of the Association's
members to levy a proposed special assessment to cover the cost
of the improvements over $10,000.

The 1981 Declaration provides

that no assessment for a single capital improvement greater than
$10,000.00 shall be made without the assessment "having been
first voted on and approved by at least a majority of the
project's undivided ownership interest."

See

Deppes Exhibit 2 at

17-18, Article XVIII.
Article XXVIII of the 1981 Declaration addresses consent in
lieu of a vote, which states:
In any case in which the Act or this Declaration
requires the vote of a stated percentage of the
Project's undivided ownership interest for
authorization or approval of a transaction, such
requirement may be fully satisfied by obtaining with or
without a meeting, consents in writing to such
transaction from Unit owners who collectively hold at
least the state percentage of undivided ownership
interest. See Deppes Exhibit 2 at 26.
A vote on the proposed special assessment that is the
subject of this case (the claimed assessment) was not held at an
annual or other special meeting of homeowners.

Rather, the

Association, by and through its Management Committee, decided to
conduct the vote on the claimed assessment by mail-in vote,
apparently pursuant to Article XXVIII, because it was too
difficult to obtain the required quorum at a meeting.
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According to the deposition testimony of Management
Committee members Cynthia Calloway, Clark Stringham, Chris Nelson
and Donna Van Buren of Greater Park City Properties handled the
balloting for the claimed assessment and Greater Park City
Properties was the official record keeper for the Association.
Greater Park City Properties did all the mailing for the
Association with respect to the ballot to vote on the claimed
assessment.
Greater Park City Properties mailed the ballot package to
vote on the claimed assessment to Association members via United
States mail on October 1, 2000.

The ballot package, in part,

requested that Association members return their votes on the
completed ballots by November 15, 2000.

See Deppes Exhibit 10.

On November 19, 2000, the ballots were counted.

According

to the official tally maintained by the Association, the claimed
assessment was approved by 64% of the Association members.

See

Deppes Exhibit 11. According to the Association's official
tally, 19% opposed the claimed assessment and 17% of the
Association's members, who were entitled to vote (including the
Deppes) did not cast any vote at all on the proposed claimed
assessment.

Id.

After trying to sell their condominium unit for two years,
on December 13, 2000, the Deppes entered into a Real Estate
Purchase Contract and Earnest Money Agreement to sell their
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See Deppes Exhibit

condominium unit to Bryan T. Morgan (Morgan).
13, Addendum 3.

The following day, on December 14, 2000, the Association
caused to be recorded a "Notice' of Special Assessment" (Notice)
in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County as Entry
No. 00578640, in Book 01345, at page 01030.

See Deppes Exhibit

12.
On January 2, 2001, the Deppes signed a warranty deed to
Morgan for the condominium unit, which was recorded on January 5,
2001, in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County as
Entry No. 00579854, in Book 01348, at page 00378.

See Deppes

Exhibit 14.
On January 5, 2001, Morgan and the Deppes executed an
"Assumption Agreement" "in favor and for the benefit of" the
Association.

See Association Exhibit B.

In the "Recitals"

section of the Assumption Agreement it stated:
Sellers are personally obligated to pay the special
assessment.
Buyers and Sellers have asked the [Association] to
subordinate its lien to Buyer's first mortgage on the
Encumbered Property in favor of Long Beach Mortgage
Company in a sum not to exceed $177,650.00.
Buyer has purchased or is about to purchase all or part
of the Encumbered Property and desires to assume
Sellers' obligation to [Association].
[Association's] consent to the subordination is
conditioned upon (1) Buyer's unconditional assumption
of the Sellers' obligations to the [Association] . . .
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In the "Agreement Terms'' section of the Assumption Agreement
it states in part:
1.

ASSUMPTION OF DEBT AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS
Effective upon transfer of the Encumbered Property
to Buyer, Buyer assumes all of sellers'
obligations to [Association]. Buyer agrees to pay
[Association] the unpaid principal balance and all
interest accrued on special assessment described
above in a timely manner.

2.

NO RELEASE - This agreement does not release the
Seller (nor any other person) from liability to
the [Association] for the special assessments.

Above the Deppes signatures is the following:
JOINDER AND CONSENT OF SELLERS
The undersigned Sellers join in and consent to all
the terms of this agreement and acknowledge that
it does not alter their liability to the
[Association]. The sellers acknowledge that
[Association] has not agreed to release them from
any of their obligations.
The Deppes wanted the sale to happen and did not think that
the Assumption Agreement was legally enforceable based upon a
See

"gut feeling."

Deppes' memo, at xi-xii.

Mr. Deppe read the

Assumption Agreement before he signed it and "nowhere in the
Assumption Agreement did it say he would pay the claimed
Assessment."

Id.

at xii.

When asked his understanding of the

provision in the Assumption Agreement that states, "Sellers are
personally obligated to pay the special assessment," Mr. Deppe
responded, "I think that my interpretation of this is that we
have - we have an obligation and we're not released from that
obligation.

But we do not in this document make a commitment to
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pay that obligation.

That would be Bryan Morgan's obligation."

See Association memo, at 9-10.
On January 20, 2001, the Association, through Greater Park
City Properties, sent the Notice to its members by certified
mail, notifying the members of the special assessment and stating
that the claimed assessment was effective December 14, 2000.
Deppes Exhibit 13.

See

This Notice was not sent to the Deppes

because the Deppes had previously sold their condominium unit.
The claimed assessment was to be paid in two installments,
the first of which was due on February 28, 2001, and the second
of which was due on June 28, 2001.
13.

See Deppes Exhibits 12 and

The work on the renovations for which the claimed assessment

was levied did not commence until at least late-spring or early
summer of 2001.
The special assessment on the condominium unit in the amount
of $32,965.00 remains unpaid.
LAW
When both parties move for summary judgment, the court is
not bound to grant it to one side or another.
Inc.

v.

Travelers

Indemnity

Co.,

Diamond T.

Utah,,

441 P.2d 705 (Utah 1968).

Cross-motions for summary judgment do not warrant the court's
granting of summary judgment unless one of the moving parties is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon facts that are not
genuinely disputed.

Amjacs

Interwest,

-1'

Inc.

v.

Design

Associates,
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635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981).
A trial court may properly grant summary judgment when
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

Utah

R. Civ. P. 56 (c).
ARGUMENTS
The Association argues that the Deppes are obligated to pay
the claimed assessment pursuant to Utah Code § 57-8-20(2) and
Article XIX(f) of the Declaration because they owned the property
when the special assessment was made.

Furthermore, the

Association argues that the Deppes are jointly and severally
liable with Morgan for all unpaid assessments pursuant to Utah
Code § 57-8-25.

Moreover, the Association argues that the Deppes

are liable for the claimed assessment as acknowledged and agreed
in the Assumption Agreement, which was not obtained by fraud,
coercion, duress or mistake.

The Association also argues that it

is entitled to 18% interest per annum on the outstanding balance
and attorney's fees.
The Deppes argue that the vote on the claimed assessment is
void because the Association failed to comply with the
requirements of the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Co-operative
Association Act in effect in 2000 as set forth in Utah Code §§
16-6-18 through -112 (Nonprofit Act) and the Utah Condominium
Ownership Act, Utah Code §§ 57-8-1 through -38 (Condominium Act).
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Specifically, the Deppes argue that the Nonprofit Act required
written consent signed by all members for the special assessment
to occur without a meeting.

The Deppes argue that Article XXVIII

of the 1981 Declaration permitting voting by mail conflicts with
the Nonprofit Act and is therefore void.

Furthermore, the Deppes

argue that they entered into a "binding contract for the sale of
the subject condo, and the later purported imposition of the
claimed assessment was invalid as to them."

Moreover, the Deppes

argue that they are not liable for the claimed assessment payment
because by its own express terms it was not due or to become due
until long after the Deppes sold and conveyed the condominium
unit.

Moreover, the Deppes are entitled to declaratory judgment

that the Assumption Agreement is invalid and otherwise
ineffective because it lacked consideration, they signed under
duress, and fails to create any obligation on the part of Deppes
to pay the claimed assessment.
In reply, the Association argues that the Assumption
Agreement obligates the Deppes because they acknowledged their
outstanding debt and agreed to continue to be personally liable
for the debt.

The Association argues that the Assumption

Agreement is valid and enforceable.

There was consideration

because the Buyer promised to assume all of the Deppes'
obligations to the Association, the Deppes paid the $250
attorney's fees and the lien was subordinated by the Association.
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There was no duress.

There was nothing shocking or unfair about

the Assumption Agreement.

The Buyer's-mortgage company requested

it, not the Association, who was a third party beneficiary of the
Assumption Agreement.
unambiguous.

Moreover, the Assumption Agreement is

The Association also argues that the mail in voting

for capital improvements was specifically authorized by the 1981
Declaration and bylaws.

The Association argues that the Deppes

owned the condominium unit at the time of the assessment.

The

REPC did not pass title to the condominium unit to the buyer upon
it acceptance.

Rather, the REPC specifically states that the

transaction is*not complete until closing.

The REPC did not give

possession of the condominium unit to Morgan until closing.
Furthermore, the REPC places the entire risk of loss, including
physical damage or destruction to property or improvements on the
seller.
DISCUSSION
The first issue is whether the Association complied with the
proper requirements to perform a mail-in vote.

The Court is not

persuaded by the Deppes argument that the Nonprofit Act and the
Utah Condominium Ownership Act in effect in 2000 prohibited the
mail in vote permitted by Article XXVIII of the 1981 Declaration.
The Utah Condominium Ownership Act permits a condominium
homeowner's association to create declarations.

Where the

declarations are silent, the Utah Condominium Ownership Act
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applies and where it is silent, then the Nonprofit Act applies.
Here, the 1981 Declaration clearly permits a mail-in vote and
does not require written consent signed by all members for the
special assessment to occur without a meeting.

Since the 1981

Declaration is not silent on the issue, the two Acts referred to
by the Deppes never come into play on the issue of mail-in
voting.

The 1981 Declaration governs the mail-in vote on the

assessment.
The next issue is whether the claimed assessment is an
obligation of the Deppes.

The Deppes argue that they sold the

unit on December 13, 2000, the day before the claimed assessment
was made.

However, the Deppes had not sold the unit on December

13, 2000, rather the Deppes had entered into an REPC.
of the unit closed on January 5, 2001.

The sale

Even though the Deppes

had entered into an REPC to sell the unit, clearly, the Deppes
owned the unit until it was sold, i.e., the Deppes retained
possession and bore the risk of loss on the unit until closing.
The assessment made on December 14, 2000, was well before the
Deppes closed on the sale weeks later.

Pursuant to § 57-8-25 and

Article XIX(f) of the 1981 Declaration, the Deppes, as the owners
of the unit, were responsible for paying the claimed assessment.
The next issue is whether the Deppes were responsible for
paying the claimed assessment because such did not become due
until after the unit was sold.

Both § 57-8-25(2) and Article
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XIX(f) specifically provide that such charges against a unit are
a debt or obligation of the owners of the unit "at the time the
assessment is made" and is collectible as such.

The assessment

was made on December 14, 2000, and as stated above, the Deppes
owned the unit on that date, therefore, the claimed assessment is
a debt or obligation of the Deppes and is collectible against
them.
The final issue is how the assumption agreement affects the
Deppes obligation.

The Deppes argue that the assumption

agreement should be declared invalid because it lacked
consideration, was signed under duress and does not create an
obligation on the part of the Deppes.

There was consideration

paid by the Deppes for the assumption agreement, $250, and the
Deppes in turn were able to close on the sale of their unit.
There was nothing that amounted to duress on the Deppes to sign
the assumption agreement.

They could have refused to sign and

the sale may not have gone through that day, but this alone does
not amount to duress.

The Deppes wanted to sell the unit and in

turn decided to sign the assumption agreement and pay $250.
does not amount to duress.

This

The Deppes are correct in stating

that the assumption agreement does not create the Deppes
obligation to pay the claimed assessment.

The Deppes obligation,

as stated above, is derived from their ownership of the unit at
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the time the claimed assessment was made.2

The Court concludes

that the assumption agreement did not affect or change the Deppes
obligation to pay the claimed assessment.
Based upon the discussion above, the Court concludes that no
genuine issues of material fact exist and the Association is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, the Court

GRANTS the Association's motion for summary judgment and denies
the Deppe's cross motion for summary judgment.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no
other order is required.

DATED

this Uf j day of August, 2005.

2

The Court notes that although the Deppes obligation is not
derived from the assumption agreement, it does reflect the Deppes
acknowledgment that they were obligated to pay the claimed
assessment and knew they were not released from the obligation by
selling the unit. For example, the assumption agreement states:
"Sellers are personally obligated to pay the special assessment.
. . . Buyer . . . desires to assume Sellers obligation to
[Association]." The assumption agreement also declares that the
Deppes are not released "from liability to the [Association] for
the special assessment." And, that the Deppes "acknowledge that
[Association] has not agreed to release them from any of their
obligations."
-13-
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ALAN SPRISGSi SUttMIT CO RECORDER
2000 DEC 15 12:16 PH FEE $155.00 BY DMG
REQUEST: JAKES R BLAKESLEY

NOTICE OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENT
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Please be advised that the Quality-Value Renovation-Repair Plan A with Funding Option No. I was
approved a majority of the undivided ownership in the common areas and facilities at the PARK
WEST CONDOMINIUM PROJECT. The total of the Special Assessment is $3,200,500.00. Since
the particular sum due from each unit and unit owner and the method of payment varies, please
contact Donna Van Buren, at Greater Park City Properties, P. O. Box 980845, Park City, Utah
84098, Phone No.: (435) 649-0652 for specific information. The Special Assessment is effective
on or about December 5, 2000. The Special Assessment is the debt of each unit owner and is
collectible as such now. The Special Assessment affects the property and units at the PARK WEST
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by
this reference.
DATED this /V* day of December, 2000.
PARK WEST

OWNERS ASSOCIATION

James R.^lakesl
Attorney foirAi
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the /*f day of December, 2000, personally appeared before me, JAMES R.
BLAKESLEY, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the attorney for the PARK WEST
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION and that the wjtiiin and forgoing instrument was signed in behalf
of said Association by authority of a resolution'ofthe Association.

Public
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:
fcJotary Public
GtortaNernelka
S83 80.1300W.
SIC, Utah 84104
My Commission Expires
February 14,2004
Stum of Utah

%Z¥d

EXHIBIT MAM

Tht ?rop«rty referred to in the Condominium Declaration to* which thii is
attached aa an exhibit ia located in Sunit County, State of Utah and ia
described aa follows:
7MCIL A:
Zeglnnlng at a point Korth 1560.29 feet and Vest 105.29 fete fron tht
Southwtst corner of Section 31; TIS, R4E. Salt Lake Rase and Meridian, and
xunnini thence S7c31kV 166.53 feet to a point on a 320.0 foot Tadlus curve;
thtnee Horthwtsttrly along said curve 112.70 feet; thenee N78°48'V 152.95 ftet;
theace V40e0OaV 226.35 feet; thence S64°08'V 212.10 feet; thence S2C°28,2SME
123.00 feee; thence S71°30'V 104.58 fete; thence 1137*14'30"ff 224.88 feet;
thtnee ?U8e28,40"U 89.02 feet; thtneo K50°00IC 278.30 feet; thence last 102.03
feet; thtnee K30°00>£ 247.14 feet; thtnee S40oG0*E 100.70 feet; thenee K50o00(£
94.00 fiet; thtnee N57°00IE 113.34 ftet; thence S40°0OfE 157.32 feet; thenee
S30°00'U 144.27 feet; thence S54°3rE 123.18 feet; thence S4°50'E 163.00 ftet
to the point of beginning.

m c a at
2Mtinning at a point Korth 2041.97 feet and Eant 98.47 fett froa tht
Southwest corner of Section 31; T1S, IUE, Salt Lake Baae and Meridian, and
running thtnee N40o00'E 168.00 feet; thence East 215.50 feet; thence North
140.00 fttt; thenee last 325.08 fctt; thenetr South 153.12 feet; thence S23°05>W
189.00 ftet; thenee S21°09,30ME 85.86 feet; thenee Southwesterly 481.86 feet
along the are of 972.0 radius curve to the left (radius point S13°05,50,<E);
thtnci Xcrthwoattrly 23.56 fttt along the are of 13.0 radius curve to the right
(radius point K4l°30,W); thtnet N41°30'V 114.95 feet; thence Northwesterly 42.76
fttt along the are of 290.0 radius curve to Che lefe (S48°30'V-Radius point);
thtnee Northeasterly 22.53 fttt along tht arc of 15.27 radius curve to tht
ltft (radius point K40o03»E); thenct 1U5°30,E 51.85 feet; thence N2°29,W 36.10
fttt; thence S69°24'U 60.00 feet; thtnet N20°36,W 30.00 feet; thenee S69°24,V
60.00 ftet; thence X20°36'V 117.30 feet; thence K69°24'E 60.00 feet; thtnee
S2Q°36,E 30.00 feet; thtnee K69°24'E 60.00 feet; theneo H50°17,U 89.03 feet
to the point of beginning.
TOCETHEX VITHx
An easeaenc for purpose of Ingress ind egress over that certai;. ..operty
doscrlbed aa follows:
- — Beginning at a point on the Westerly right of way line of Utah Highway 224,
said point located Worth 1959.01 fett and East 1411.57 feet froa the Southwest
corntr of Section 31; TIS, X4E, Salt Lake Base, and Meridian, and running thence
80°13'X 119.30 feet along said Westerly right of way to a point on a 1058.68 *
foot radius curve to the Ictt;
thence Southerly along the are of said curve
12.33 feet to a point on a reverse curve to the left, the radius point of
which bears S89°06,54**V 30.00 feet; thence Northwesterly alone the are of said
reverse curve 46.66 feet to a point of tangency; thenee Vest 457.95 feet to
a point on a 900.00 foot radius curve to the left; thence Southwesterly along
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LEGIBILITY OF WRITING. TYPING OR
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the are of said curve 651.83 feet to a point of tancency; thence S48°38'U
021*19 feet to a point on a 392.00 foot, radius curve to the right; thence
Northwesterly along the ere of said curve 366,02 (cot to a point of tendency,
thence N78°00«W 182.52 feet to a point on a 339.50 foot radius curve to the left;
ihtnce Westerly along the .arc of said curve 201*46 feet to a point of reverse
curvature} thince Westerly 125.87 feet along the arc of laid 1260.00 foot
radius curve to the right the long chord of which bears S70°5i,42,,tf 125.83 feet;
ihtnce N32°00'W 62.46 feet to a oolnt on a curve; thence Northeasterly 136.81
feet along the arc of said 1200.00 foot radius curve to the left the long chord
of which bears H71«51>28'*C 136.75 feet; thence Easterly 278*73 feet along the
arc of a 469.70 foot radius curve to the right chord of which bears N8S°Q0'E
274.63 feetf thsnee 3 78°00,E 143.27 feet*to A point on a 320.00 foot radius
curve to the left; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve 298.79 feet
to a point of tsn.tncy; lh.net N48°30 I E 255.19 feet to a point on a 15.00 foot
radius curve to the left; thence Northerly along the are of said curve 23.56
feet to a point of tangency; thence N41°30'W 114.95 feet to a point on a 254.00
foot radius curve to the left; thence Korthvesterly along the are of said curve
117.48 fctt to a point of tangency; thence H68°00'U 76.72 feet to * point on a
416.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence Northwesterly along the arc of
said curve 203.29 fset to a point of tenancy; thence N40°Q0»W 57.5} feet;
thtnctN5Qe00»E 36.00 feet; thenee S40°00»E 57.53 feet to a point on a 380.00
foot radius curve to the left} thence Southeasterly along the are of said
curve 1*55.70 feet to a point of tangency, thence S68°00 , E 76.72 feet to a point
on a 290.00 foot radius curve to the right;, thence Southeasterly along the are
of said curve 134.13 feet to a point of tangency; thenee S4l°30«E 114.95 feet
to a point on a 15*00 foot radius curve to the left; thenee Easterly along the
are of said curve 23.56 feet to a point of reverse curvature on a 972.00 foot
radius curve to the right; thence Easterly along the are of said curve 704.02
feet to a point of tangency; thence East 457.38 feet to a point on a 30.00 foot
radius curve to the left; thence Northerly along the are of aaid curve 47.24
feet to the point of beginning.
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EXHIBIT "A"
TZRcnnxct
UNIX N0«

1-A
1-5
I-B
1-C
2-4
2-B
3-A
3-B

3-C
3-D
A-A
4-3
4-C
4-D

S-4
PA
(-3
6-C

«
7-JL

7-a
e-ja
B-A2

*-B
fOX
*»**
9-ax
9-U
10-A
10-U
10-B2

1XTIXZSI IN
CCW3H AREAS

.91
.91
.91
•91
.91
.91
.91
.91
.91
.91'
.91
.91
.91
.91
1.80
.91
.91
.91
.91
.91
.91
.42
•44
•91
.43
.44
.43
.44
•91
•43
.44
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FXHI^IT "A" (Cont,*)
PEKCECTACE
IXTEREST XH

warjvO.
11-A
ll-B
11-C
U-t>
12-Al
t2-A2
12-Bl
12-82
13-Al
13-A2
U-Bl
13-B2
H-Al
14-A2
14-Bl
X4-B2
••all-Cl

X4-C2

u-n
X4-D2
15-Al
15-A2
15-Bl
15-12
It-Al
1S-A2
1S-B1
X6-B2
17-ul
17-A2
17-B1
17-B2
17-C1
17-C2
17-Dl
17-02

cofens
.91
.91
•91
•91
•43
•44
•43
•44
.43
.44
•43
•44
.43
• 54
•43
.54
•43
.54
.43
•54
•43
•44
•43
•44
•43
•44
•43
•44
•43
•54
•43
•54
•43
•54
.43
•54
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EXHIBIT "A" (Cont'd)

inciT wo,
12-A
29-A
20^
2C-B
21-B
21-C
21-D
22-A
22-B
23-A
23-2
24-A
24-B
24-C
25-A
23-B
25-C
25-0
26-A
26-B
26-C
27-A
27-B
27-C
2e^A
2S-B
28-C
2B-D
29-A
29-B
29-C
29-D
30-A
3 CUB

PC^ECTACE
IKTPIEST XM
COT-fl ON AREAS

•91
•91
•91
•91
•91
•91
• 91
•91
•91
.91
•91
.91
• 91
• 63
.96
1.03
.63
• 96
.96

1.03
.65
1.03
1.03
1.03
2.03
• 65
1.03
•96
.96
•65
3.03
•96
•96
.65
• 65
• 65
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EXHIBIT "A"

(Cont'd)
PKRCrj;/ACE
IKiTKCST IK

in: IT £0^

COZ-IOH ARIAS

31-A
31-?

• 65
1.03

31-C
32-^

1.03
• 65

32-B

1.03

32-<

\.03

33-A

.65

33-B

'.96

33-C

•96

33-0

1.03

3'i-A

.65

3A-B

1.03 •

34-C
35-A

1.03

33-B
>r

• 65
1.03

35-C

1.03

3^-A

1.C3

36-8

1.03

36-C

.65

37-A

1.03

37-B

.96

37-C

.96

370

• 65

38-A

1.03

38-B

•96

3S-C

.96

32-D

• 65

0"o^
1J
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STATE OF UTAH

i ss.

County of Summit
i, Aian Spriggs, County Recorder in and for Summit County. State of Utah,
do hereby certify that the attached and foregoing is a full, true and correct copy
of that certain ^ ^ L c
J ^ c J ^
^ ^ ^ ^ - - T r
Cy
which appears of record in my office in Book
being Entry No. S^J^ <CC/CK

/^ ^

Pnc\& /€«£% - /r.*?5

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, i have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official seal, this / / ^
day o\Cc&r>Si?
20JjS_.

o.
r
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